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Large geographic disparities in E/Pop, 
related to size, manufacturing, and…
Why not move people to jobs? (1) People don’t want to move; 













Elasticity of local jobs to population shock
Our main jobs-to-people strategy is 
state/local business incentives
• Incentives tripled 1990-2015, to $50 billion/year.
• Foxconn & some Amazon offers 10x avg incentive/job
• Incentives not targeted on distressed areas.
• Targeted on tradable industries, but little correlation with industry 
R&D or wages.
• Favor large firms: firms > 100 employees get 90%, compared to 
their 66% employment share.
• Many incentives long-term, > 10 years. 
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Market-failure rationale for subsidizing jobs in distressed 
places: asymmetric benefits due to social costs of involuntary 
unemployment
• Bartik (2009, 2015) finds MSAs w/ higher non-
employment have 2/3rds higher E/Pop effects. But only 
marginally statistically significant.
• Austin/Glaeser/Summers (2018) find that “consistent 
PUMAs” with lower prime-age male E/Pop have 3/5ths 
higher E/Pop effects. But both geographic unit & distress 
indicator are problematic. 
• Should geo area be smaller than CZ? Spatial mismatch, 
recent evidence from Manning/Petrongolo (2017).
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Demand shocks to CZs dominate county shocks, due to both 
multiplier & labor market spillovers
OLS 2SLS (share IVs) Reduced form
County effects 0.215 0.195 0.122
(0.035) (0.153) (0.077)
CZ effects 0.117 0.340 0.497
(0.048) (0.165) (0.105)
County CZ
County share effect 0.543 0.046
(0.066) (0.025)
CZ share effect 0.622 1.103
(0.094) (0.076)
609 counties >65K pop (77% of U.S.) in 225 CZs; 2005-06 to 2015-16.
Year dummies included; clustered at CZ. Data: ACS; BEA; WholeData.
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1st-stage share effects on change in Iog(emp) of:
Effects of shocks to county/CZ log(emp) on year-to-year change in county log(emp/pop)
CZ demand shock effects vary more significantly with 
overall (E/Pop) than with sub-group E/Pop
Lagged (E/P) interaction is for group on right All 16+ Prime-age Non-college 25+
Share effect (defined as shock to log E) 0.152 0.332 0.285 
(0.145) (0.128) (0.143)
Share effect*lagged log(E/P) -0.918 -1.112 -0.804
(0.211) (0.314) (0.240)
Elasticity at 10th percentile of (E/P) 0.767 0.716 0.727
(0.107) (0.096) (0.094)
Elasticity at 90th percentile of E/P 0.548 0.539 0.570
(0.094) (0.098) (0.100)
10th percentile 0.512 0.708 0.578
90th percentile 0.649 0.831 0.702
Ratio of effects 1.40 1.33 1.28
Estimates for 240 CZs>200K pop (89% of U.S.), 2005-06 to 2015-16. Year dummies included, clustered at CZ. 
All 3 regressions used same dependent variable: change in OVERALL log(E/Pop). 6
Demand shock effects on annual change in log of  CZ overall (E/P), interacted with lagged (E/P) for 
different groups 
D-shock effects vary non-linearly with 
distress, vary more for LFP, by >4 to 1.
Dep var: change in (logged) E/Pop E/LabF LabF/Pop
0.794 0.318 0.476 
(0.118) (0.055) (0.098)
Upper half of CZs (avg. E/Pop is 62.5%)
0.396 0.284 0.113 
(0.132) (0.080) (0.082)
T-stat on difference 2.25 0.35 2.85
3 dep var by 2 groups = 6 regressions. Includes year dummies, clustered at CZ. 240 
CZs comprise 89% of U.S. population.
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Effect of log(demand shock) on change in log(3 diff labor force outcomes), 
2 CZ groupings; 120 CZs in each grouping. 
Lower E/Pop half of CZs (27% of total pop; cutoff 1 pp below nat avg; avg 
E/Pop is 54.8%)
Do local Ld shocks have lasting labor 
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LR elasticity of (E/Pop) wrt local jobs
Other studies:
Freedman (2017) “Mississippi's 1936 BAWI program increased county LFP for >24 yrs.”
Hershbein/Stuart (forthcoming)   “MSAs with worse recessions have lower E/Pop a decade later”
Are there MARGINAL agglomeration economies to 
adding jobs to local clusters, & do they VARY by place?
• Agglomeration exists, but are there benefits of adding still 
more tech jobs to Silicon Valley?
• Might justifying targeting tech in tech clusters; might be 
way for distressed places to lower cost per job created.
• Agglomeration used to justify higher multipliers (REMI).
• Moretti (2010) estimated high-tech multiplier of 6, which 
would justify very large incentives. 
9
LR high-tech multiplier varies 










High-tech 1.428 0.371 -9.169 1.963
(0.327) (0.180) (4.531) (0.449)
Low-tech 1.219 -0.004 -0.111 -0.532
(0.138) (0.057) (1.012) (0.155)
Standard dev of interaction term times 
high-tech coefficient 0.379 -0.586 0.762
284 CZs w/ 1998 employment>50K (93% of U.S.), 1998-99 to 2015-16. Multiplier is cumulative effect of share effect demand shock 
w/ 5 lags. 979 industries used. High-tech are 14% of total jobs, & have industry employment in science/engineering/technician 
occupations that is 2x national avg. Year dummies included, & standard errors clustered by CZ. Dependent variable is year-to-year change 
in log(CZ employment).
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Interaction of LR High-tech and Low-tech Multipliers with Local Employment Size, Prime-Age 
Employment Rate, and Initial High-tech Share
High-tech multiplier: threshold effects in 
high-tech share, 20 groups of CZs
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Services to provide business inputs can sometimes be more cost-
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TVA (Infrastructure?), Kline/Moretti (2014)
Brownfield redevelopment, Paull (2008)
Empowerment zones (block grant + hiring
credits), Busso/Gregory/Kline (2013)
Manufacturing extension, Jarmin(1998, 1999)
Customized job training,
Holzer/Block/Cheatham/Knott (1993)
High-tech business tax incentives in high-tech
areas, Bartik/Sotherland (2019)
Average business tax incentives, Bartik (2018)
Annual costs per job-year created  (uses 3% discount rate)
Principles for how states should reform 
incentives
• Choose incentive levels based on state’s distress levels, and 
target distressed areas within states.
• Target high-tech firms in high-tech areas.
• Reduce long-term incentives.
• Don’t favor larger firms.
• Rely more on services enhancing business inputs (including 
business services, infrastructure, skills).
• Evaluate (RDD, surveys, simulation models).
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VA’s HQ2 deal was $20K per job in cash (nat 
avg is $50K), more $ for skills, infrastructure
High job growth cities with high employment 
rates should cut back incentives.
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Should feds intervene?
• No efficiency problem if states/locals optimally price job creation.
• Distributional problems even with optimal Tiebout competition: 
distressed areas pay, capital owners gain (Slattery, 2019).
• Political problems: state/local political leaders gain politically by 
long-term cash incentives to largest firms. 
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A proposal for federal block grant 
assistance for distressed communities
• Federal block grant for distressed communities recognizes 
diverse needs & ideas, & potential synergies.
• Tie block grant to reducing excessive long-term incentives for 
1,500 firms w/ >10K employees.
• Evaluate block grant via RDD.
• Program size: $18-$36 billion per year for 10 to 20 years is a 
realistic magnitude to help distressed areas’ job needs. 
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What will promote needed reforms?
• Transparency
• Evaluation
• Well-developed alternatives to cash incentives
• Full-employment macro environment
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